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Abstract
Value-added analysis is a common tool in analysing school performances. In this paper,
we analyse the SIMCE panel data which provides individual scores of about 200,000
students in Chile, and whose aim is to rank schools according to their educational
achievement. Based on the data collection procedure and on empirical evidences, we
argue that the exogeneity of some covariates is questionable. This means that a nonva-
nishing correlation appears between the school-specific effect and some covariates. We
show the impact of this phenomenon on the calculation of the value-added and on the
ranking, and provide an estimation method that is based on instrumental variables in
order to correct the bias of endogeneity. Revisiting the definition of the value-added,
we propose a new calculation robust to endogeneity that we illustrate on the SIMCE
data.
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1 Introduction
A typical way to measure the school performance is to compare the progress that students
make between two or more test occasions. Among the numerous measurement methods,
the “value-added analysis” has often been considered in empirical studies (see e.g. OECD
(2008) and the references therein). The value-added analysis aims at measuring the gain (or
the loss) of beeing in a given school with respect to an average school. This average school is
defined as the average performance of the schools that are found in the data set, and there-
fore the value-added provides a data-driven measure of school effectiveness. Another aspect
of the value-added analysis is that it usualy controls for a set of variables such as individ-
ual characteristics (e.g. students gender or socio-economic level) or school/environmental
characteristics. Moreover, the previous attained score of the students is always considered
as a control variable.
Measuring the value-added requires an appropriate model for the test score. Due to
the hierarchical structure found in educational data sets, the multilevel generalized linear
model is used routinely in this analysis. In the statistical parlance, the value-added in this
model is calculated as the predictor of the random school-effect of the multilevel regression
(Raudenbush and Willms, 1995; Tekwe et al., 2004).
The recent literature however has shown that systematic bias problems occur in the
inference for the multilevel model on educational data. A typical source of bias is due to
omitted variables (Kim and Frees, 2006; Lockwood and McCaffrey, 2007). The reason may
be explained as follows. We have recalled that the multilevel regression model used in the
value-added analysis contains the prior attainment score as a regressor. Suppose that a
variable is omitted in this model and this variable is correlated with both the actual test
score and the prior test score. Because the variable is omitted, it is therefore included in the
error term of the multilevel model. Therefore, the error of the model is not uncorrelated with
the prior attainment score. This correlation is a source of bias in the standard estimation
for regression model, and is sometimes called an endogeneity bias (Halaby, 2004; Steele,
Vignoles and Jenkins, 2007).
The last argument will be extensively described and discussed in this paper. It has
an important impact on the inference for multilevel models because it is not obvious to
understand which variable is omitted or, if so, it is not always easy to measure this omitted
variable. For instance, the school effect is by definition unobserved and is influential on
both the previous attainment score and the actual score, provided that the student has not
switched schools between the two tests. In more technical terms, there is a non vanishing
correlation between the random school-effect and the prior attaintment score as soon as the
student has already been “treated” by its school at the time of the first test occasion. This
shows why the endogeneity bias is systematic when there is little movement of students
between test occasions.
The literature contains some methods of estimation to circumvent the endogeneity bias
in multilevel models. Two major contributions are Ebbes, Bo¨ckenholt and Wedel (2004)
and Kim and Frees (2007), and we also cite the recent work of Grilli and Rampichini (2009)
in the context of general measurement errors. The present paper aims to study the impact
of the endogeneity on the measure of the value-added. We show that, in the presence of
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endogeneity, an additive correcting term must be applied on the usual calculation of the
value-added indicator of a school. We provide the exact form of the correction term and
show how to calculate it from data.
Our methodology is motivated and illustrated by the study of the Chilean school per-
formance. A rich dataset is used in which the score in mathematics and other covariates of
163,286 students from 1,886 schools were measured in 2004 and 2006. A description of the
Chilean educational system and of the research on school effectiveness in that country is to
be found in Section 2 below. In Section 3, the dataset is described. Section 4 starts with
a structural definition of the value-added and shows the result of a value-added analysis
under standard assumptions (e.g. under exogeneity of all covariates). In Section 4.3, we
argue that the endogeneity of some covariates is not avoidable and we describe the impact
of this endogeneity on the value-added. The calculated value-added may be used in order to
rank schools according to their performance. We show what is the impact of the endogene-
ity on the school ranking. In Section 4.4, we demonstrate how the value-added has to be
corrected, and we show the impact of this correction on the value-added of the 1,886 chilean
schools. A formal definition of the multilevel model under endogeneity is also presented in
the Appendix. The appendix describes the steps that are used in order to calculate the
value-added under endogeneity.
2 Chilean Educational System and School Effectiveness Re-
search
2.1 The SIMCE test
One of the most important aspects in the development and achievements of a country
is having a satisfactory educational system that is accessible to all, or the big majority,
of its individuals. In Chile, it is widely acknowledged that the state of its educational
system is a hindrance to its development. A key aspect that has been criticized is the poor
quality of some school teachers with limited knowledge of the material that they need to
teach. Another aspect is the inequality between public schools and private schools (see
OECD (2007)). However during the last decades Chile has worked to improve the quality
of its education leading to the generation of novel public policies to tackle a part of the
problems. Some examples are the increase in the amount of time that students should
spend at school, and a new law stating that it is mandatory that all students get education
for the four years that correspond to secondary education. The Preferential Subsidy Law
(passed by the Senate on May 4, 2009) is another example. Broadly speaking, this new
law fixes conditions to evaluating students’ performance and, based on them, to classify
schools into three types: charter school, emerging school, and recovery school. Economical
and administrative support are provided to schools according to that classification.
With the aim of uncovering the possible causes of deficiency in the educational system,
the Chilean government has been systematically gathering data since 1988 about students’
performance. This large scale data collection is known as the SIMCE test (SIMCE stands
for Sistema de Medicio´n de Calidad de la Educacio´n). This policy is consistent with what
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the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has found to be the
first step to unveil the problems in the educational system (OECD, 2008). Together with
the national voucher system, a national evaluation of student performance was conceived
that would provide parents with necessary information to make decisions about schools. In
1988, students in all Chilean schools begun to be tested with the SIMCE test, which was
given in alternating years in 4th and 8th grade, and later in 1994, also in 10th grade. Since
2005, the SIMCE test was applied all the years to 4th grade. Until 1994, SIMCE results were
delivered only in aggregates, they were given only to schools and Municipalities, and were
not comparable for different years. Starting in 1995, the SIMCE results by schools begun
being publicized through the media, with the aim of contributing to its original purpose of
providing information for parents to make decisions about schools.
In 1998, SIMCE suffered several changes. First, an effort was made to tightly tie the
SIMCE tests into the educational goals and contents specified in the new national curricula
defined by the Chilean Ministry of Education. Together with this, the instruments were
modified to include not only multiple choice questions, but also open questions devoted to
test more complex skills such as critical thinking or written expression. The complemen-
tary questionnaires for parents and school principals were also modified in order to collect
better quality information at the individual level. In 2000, results of the SIMCE started
to be published by group of schools having a comparable socioeconomic status, in order
to facilitate comparisons between schools that educate similar students. With the aim to
improve the quality of teaching, the government also asked to provide example of questions
and solutios in the final report of the SIMCE test given to schools. For an example of a
SIMCE report, see SIMCE (2009).
With regards to the instruments themselves, Item Response Theory methodology has
been introduced in 2000, allowing comparisons across years, and making it possible to
produce more accurate descriptions of different levels of performance, to measure with
precision students with different skill levels, and to examine possible item bias. For details,
see SIMCE (2008).
Taking into account the calendar of the SIMCE applications, it is possible for each stu-
dent to obtain two measures of their educational performance. Most of these measurements
will be taken every four years; for instance, students who were measured in 2005, were still
measured in 2009 when they were in the 8th grade. In the study reported in this paper, we
considered students who were measured in 2004 (when they were at the 8th grade) and in
2006 (when they were at the 10th grade).
2.2 The Chilean educational system
The Chilean education system has suffered several changes in the last three decades. In 1980,
elements of privatization and decentralization were introduced through a massive voucher
system by which private schools were allowed to receive a state subsidy proportional to the
number of students attending classes, as long as they met certain requirements. At the
same time, administration of public schools was shifted from the Ministry of Education to
local authorities (Municipalities). Up to 1980, the Ministry of Education was in charge of
financing public education, establishing educational contents and investing in infrastructure.
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After the 1980’s reform, the Ministry retained authority over educational contents and goals,
and it was responsible for supervising the functioning of schools receiving voucher monies,
while infrastructure and hiring decisions were delegated to local school administrators, both
public and private. As a consequence of the introduction of private operators into the
system, a new group of schools was created – private-subsidized schools – and this increased
the number of schools significantly in later years.
From 1990, a significant increase in public investment in education was registered. This
increase in investment had a clear impact on education coverage. According to Bellei (2005),
between 1990 and 2000 this raised coverage in primary education from 93% to 98% and from
74% to 85% in secondary education. However, increases in educational quality, as measured
by standardized tests, were not evident. It is likely that the increases in education coverage
in those years have actually lowered average test scores, as children who would otherwise
have been outside the school system begin to enter school. In spite of this, test scores have
not experienced a drop. For example, in 2003 there was a 20% increment over the previous
year in the number of students taking the national SIMCE tests, but average SIMCE scores
did not drop significantly.
In 1991, the “Estatuto Docente” was created, establishing regulations for teacher salaries
and protecting them from being fired from the Municipal system, tending to make the
system more rigid. Also in 1991, a number of improvement programs were put in place that
targeted schools which cater to the most vulnerable students. In 1993 shared financing is
introduced, which allowed private-subsidized and secondary public schools to charge parents
a fee in addition to the state voucher, provide that this fee does not exceed a certain value.
Primary public schools can not use this system, and secondary public schools can charge a
fee only with the agreement of the majority of parents in the school.
The Chilean schools are accordingly grouped into four groups: Public I schools are fi-
nanced by the state and administered by county corporations, whereas Public II schools
are also financed by the state, but administered by county governments; Subsidized schools
are financed by both the state and parents, and administered by the private sector; Private
schools are fee-paying schools that operate solely on payments from parents and adminis-
tered by the private sector.
2.3 School effectiveness research in Chile
Chilean researchers have undertaken qualitative effectiveness research particularly on schools
in poverty. Among the research reports on school effectiveness based on SIMCE data, the
two mostly influential works are Bellei, Raczynski, Mun˜oz and Perez (2004) and Eyzaguirre
(2004). One aim in Bellei et al. (2004) is to characterize efficient schools. The method
used in this report classifies schools according to an average of the SIMCE scores. One
aim of Eyzaguirre (2004) was to study the factors of performance for the schools that are
considered to have the lowest socio-economic level. However, sampling procedures were
misleading, which probably led to the author to conclude (challenging most international
literature) that ’this evidence shows that education in poverty does not differ essentially
from the education of pupils located in other contexts’ (Eyzaguirre, 2004, p.259).
The Chilean government has recently funded several studies on school effectiveness based
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on the SIMCE data set. Between 2007 and 2009, the SIMCE office (from the Ministry of
Education) commissioned three value-added studies, using the SIMCE data sets: a na-
tional value-added study with the 2004 and 2006 SIMCE applications (Pino, San Mart´ın,
Manzi and Taut, 2008) and two value-added analysis at the Metropolitan Region level (Pino,
San Mart´ın, Manzi, Taut and Gonza´lez, 2008; Pino, Gonzlez, Manzi and San Mart´ın, 2009).
These studies were relevant not only for being the first national value-added analysis per-
formed in Chile with governmental support, but also by showing that the ranking of schools
obtained by value-added indicators are dramatically different from the ranking obtained by
averaging the SIMCE scores. From a political point of view, these results provide a more
transparent way to compare school effectiveness in Chile.
Another example is the study ordered by the Ministry of Education of the Chilean
government, dealing with the determination of standards for learning in the Chilean edu-
cational system (R. Paredes et al., 2010) . The context of this study was the Preferential
Subsidy Law above-mentioned. One of the objectives of the study was to identify specific
factors explaining students performance as measured by the SIMCE test. The main objec-
tive was to use this information to estimate school effectiveness and thus to obtain school
classification into the three categories mentioned above (charter school, emerging school
and recovery school). Another related study commanded by the government was the clas-
sification of schools with the purpose of distributing resources to more vulnerable schools
(Marshall, Huerta, Alvarado and Ponce, 2008).
It should be mentioned that the aforementioned studies and many others are expected
to guide some aspects of the implementation of a new law, called Ley General de Educacio´n
(General Law of Education), that is nowadays being discussed by the Parliament. This law
requires the creation of an agency, the National Agency for School Quality, which will be
in charge of measuring the quality and achievements of schools.
3 Data description
3.1 The 2004 and 2006 SIMCE applications
The dataset used in this study correspond to the 2004 and 2006 cross sections of the SIMCE
test in the field of Mathematics. In 2004, the test was applied to 276,365 students from
the 8th level. In 2006 most of the tested students were at the 10-th level. Using the
unique national identity card, it was possible to link both cross sections at the student
level, obtaining thus a panel of 177,463 students over two periods of time. We also limited
the data set in considering schools with at least 20 students. The final dataset considered
in our study contains 163,286 students spread in 1,886 schools. Of these, 9.1% are Public
Schools of Type I, 22.6% are Public Schools of Type II; 55.7% are Subsidized Schools; and
12.6% are Private Schools.
The Chilean Ministry of Education defines the socio-economic status of the schools
(herewith denoted by ses) taking into account regularly collected information at school
level. Five ordered levels are defined from A to E, level A being the lowest socio-economic
level. Of the 1,886 schools, 353 (i.e. 18.7%) are classified at level A; 530 (i.e. 28.1%) at
level B; 496 (i.e. 26.3%) at level C; 288 (i.e. 15.3%) at level D; and 219 (i.e. 11.6%) at level
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Table 1: Number of Schools by Type of School and Socio-economic Status
Public Schools Public Schools Subsidized Private
ses Type I Type II Schools Schools
A 37 (2.0%) 215 (11.4%) 101 (5.4%) . 353 (18.7%)
B 103 (5.5%) 158 (8.4%) 269 (14.3%) . 530 (28.1%)
C 27 (1.4%) 48 (2.5%) 421 (22.3%) . 496 (26.3%)
D 5 (0.3%) 5 (0.3%) 249 (13.2%) 29 (1.5%) 288 (15.3%)
E . . 10 (0.5%) 209 (11.1%) 219 (11.6%)
172 (9.1%) 426 (22.6%) 1,050 (55.7%) 238 (12.6%) 1,886
Table 2: SIMCE Mathematics performance by Type of School
Type of Number of Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
School Students mat06 mat06 mat04 mat04
Public Schools I 22,799 (14.0%) 245.8 64.6 253.5 48.5
Public Schools II 50,918 (31.2%) 241.8 61.1 251.1 46.9
Subsidized Schools 77,314 (47.3%) 263.5 61.9 264.7 47.0
Private School 12,255 (7.5%) 331.7 47.1 315.4 40.8
E. Table 1 shows the number and percentage of schools by both socio-economic status and
type of schools.
The SIMCE-scores of students were estimated by the SIMCE office from the Chilean
Ministry of Education using a 2PL model; for details on this model model, see Embretson
and Reise (2000). Tables 2 and 3 show a summary of the scores of the students controlled by
type of school and by socio-economic status of the school, respectively. In tables, mat04 and
mat06 denote the score in the field of Mathematics obtained in 2004 and 2006, respectively.
It can be noticed a significant relationship between socio-economic status and Mathematics
performance. This feature has already been established in other studies for school achieve-
ment, such as the PISA test (OECD, 2007, Chapter4). This information is complemented
with Gaussian kernel density estimators of the corresponding scores as shown in Figure 1;
the bandwidths were chosen using the rule-of thumb as introduced by Silverman (1986, p.
48). For panel (a) in Figure 1, the bandwidths are equal to 5.86 (Public I schools), 4.83
(Public II schools), 4.45 (Subsidized schools) and 5.37 (Private schools). For panel (b),
7.81 (Public I schools), 6.29 (Public II schools), 5.87 (Subsidized schools) and 5.92 (Private
schools). For panel (c), 4.79 (SES A), 4.36 (SES B), 4.70 (SES C), 5.48 (SES D) and 5.37
(SES E). For panel (d), 6.14 (SES A), 5.77 (SES B), 6.09 (SES C), 6.47 (SES D) and 5.89
(SES E).
3.2 Description of the covariates
Together with the application of SIMCE test, a questionnaire is applied to parents in order
to collect socio-demographic information. At the individual level, the following covariates
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Table 3: SIMCE Mathematics performance by School Socioeconomic Status
ses Number of Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Students mat06 mat06 mat04 mat04
A 29,369 222.5 53.4 236.3 41.6
B 60,143 237.2 57.9 247.3 43.8
C 43,600 274.3 57.3 272.9 44.2
D 18,649 308.3 53.9 296.7 43.5
E 11,525 333.7 45.7 316.8 40.3
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Figure 1: Gaussian kernel density estimators for the 2004- and 2006-scores
distributions
7
Table 4: Student school movement between 2004 and 2006
Type of Percentage of Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
move School students mat06 mat06 mat04 mat04
No Public Schools I 2,904 (1.8%) 260.4 72.8 265.2 55.9
Public Schools II 5,799 (3.6%) 265.3 72.5 269.1 55.8
Subsidized Schools 29,907(18.3%) 280.4 60.0 276.0 46.4
Private School 10,320 (6.3%) 334.2 45.8 317.7 40.1
Yes Public Schools I 19,895 (12.2%) 243.7 63.0 251.8 47.0
Public Schools II 45,119 (27.6%) 238.7 58.8 248.7 45.1
Subsidized Schools 47,407 (29.0%) 252.9 60.8 257.6 45.9
Private School 1,935 (1.2%) 318.3 51.1 303.2 42.4
are collected:
1. Mother’s educational level (mothed) and father’s educational level (fathed). Parents
are asked to indicate the last completed educational level. An educational level of
0 year means no education. Primary school is between 1 and 8 years; secondary
school is between 9 and 12 years; technical secondary school is 13 years; technical
professional school is 14 or 15 years; incomplete university education is 16 years;
complete university level is 17 years; master level is 18 years; and PhD level is 19
years.
2. Student school movement indicator (move). This is a categorical variable indicating
whether a student moved from a school to another school between 2004 and 2006. As
Table 4 shows, 70% of students moved between 2004 and 2006. This mobility is due
in part to the fact that most schools attended by students at 2004 organized studies
at the primary level only. Therefore those students were obliged to change school
between the two periods of testing.
3. Student fall indicator (fall). This is a categorical variable, which indicates whether
a student had to repeat a grade in the past before 2006.
4. Gender.
At the school level, the following covariables were available:
1. Socio-economic status of the school (ses) (above-described).
2. Selectivity of the school (select). A selectivity mechanism widely used by schools
is the selectivity by ability. In their questionnaire, parents are asked whether a test
of knowledge on their child was organized when they applied for the school. Schools
which use this mechanism of selection are free to decide whom to apply such a test.
For each school, select corresponds to the proportion of questionnaires which report
the application of such a mechanism.
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4 Statistical Analysis by Instrumental Mixed Modeling
4.1 A Definition of the value-added
Since our database contains two cross-sections, a possible approach to measure the effective-
ness of schools is to compute their so-called value-added. Value-added measures the gain (or
loss) of being in a given school and is based on the student progress. It therefore requires
at least one lagged measure of the score representing a baseline. Progression of students
in each schools are then compared jointly, that is the gain (or loss) of being educated in a
given school is calculated with respect to an “average” school; see Raudenbush and Willms
(1995); Raudenbush (2004) and OECD (2008, pp.16-17).
In order to formalize that notion we denote by mat06ij the observed score in mathematics
in 2006 for pupil i belonging to school j, and by mat04ij the lagged score in 2006. All other
covariates, being school-specific or not, are denoted by the vector Xij . In addition to those
covariates, we also have the possibility to control for the school selectivity by adding other
covariates. A natural candidate is to take the average of mat04ij over students in each
school j as a possible control variable. That variable is below denoted by avmat04j and will
be showed to satisfactorily control for the unobserved selectivity process of schools.
The random effect of school j is denoted by θj . By definition this latent variable controls
for school-heterogeneity and thus represents unobserved school-specific characteristics that
may include both school practices (on which school have some control) and school contexts
(Raudenbush, 2004). With these notations, the value-added is the measure of the following
difference :
VAj =
1
nj
nj∑
i=1
E(mat06ij | mat04ij, avmat04j ,X ij , θj) −
(1)
1
nj
nj∑
i=1
E(mat06ij | mat04ij, avmat04j ,X ij),
where nj is the number of pupils belonging to school j. The first term is the average of
the expected scores given the specific characteristics of school j when controlling for the
lagged score, the selectivity and all other covariates. The second term integrates out the
school-specific effect and therefore represents the average of expected scores of an average
school given the covariates.
The practical computation of these expectations are based on a specific model that must
be assumed on the score. Hierarchical linear mixed (HLM) models appear to be a widely
used standard in the topic of educational assessment. It assumes the following specification:
mat06ij =X
′
ijβ + γmat04ij + αavmat04j + θj + ǫij , (2)
where β is a vector of parameter (we have modeled the intercept as the first element of β), γ
is the parameter of the lagged score, and ǫij are independent errors, possibly heteroscedastic
and often assumed to be zero-mean and normally distributed. If the school random effect
θj is supposed to be independent from ǫij and from all covariates of the model, then the
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expectation E(θj | mat04ij , avmat04j ,X ij) vanishes and we find that
VAj = θj
(3)
= E(mat06ij | mat04ij , avmat04j ,X ij, θj)−E(mat06ij | mat04ij, avmat04j,X ij)
for all i; that is, the value-added of school j is given by the random effect θj. This equality
makes explicit the structural meaning of the random effect θj and actually explains why
and in which sense it is a representation of the value-added of school j. In this setting, the
value-added is computed as the predictor of the random effect, as typically done in this type
of literature; see e.g. Raudenbush and Willms (1995); Goldstein and Spiegelhalter (1996);
Goldstein and Thomas (1996); Tekwe et al. (2004); Hutchison et al. (2005).
4.2 Results from a standard valued-added analysis
In a preliminary analysis, a homoscedastic HLM model has been fitted to the SIMCE data.
However, after residual analysis controlling by the socio-economic status of the schools, it
was concluded that the normality assumption of the random effect is violated. We therefore
run the valued-added analysis by fitting a heteroscedastic HLMmodels in which the variance
of θj and ǫij may depend on the socio-economic level of the school. More specifically, the
variance structure in (2) is supposed to be such that
V ar(Yij | mat04ij, avmat04j,X ij , θj) = σ
2
ρ(j) for all students i belonging to school j,
V ar(θj | mat04ij, avmat04j,X ij) = τ
2
ρ(j),
where ρ is a function that maps j into the socioeconomic status of school j; that is, ρ(j) = A
if the socio-economic status of the school j is A, and so on. In agreement with this structure,
the conditional model of Yij given mat04ij, avmat04j,X ij and θj was specified with an
intercept for each socio-economic level using the covariate ses.
The initial within-variances are τ̂2A = 1, 313.1; τ̂
2
B = 1, 109.3; τ̂
2
C = 1, 412.2; τ̂
2
D =
3, 586.1; and τ̂2E = 7, 388.4; and the initial between-variances are σ̂
2
A = 2, 433.9; σ̂
2
B =
2, 515.9; σ̂2C = 2, 411.4; σ̂
2
D = 2, 202.2; σ̂
2
E = 1, 831.1. Once it is controlled by the baseline
score mat04, along with an intercept by each socio-economic level, both the within and
between variances decrease dramatically. Nine specifications were fitted and are summarized
in Table 6. The reference for ses is the socio-economic status A; the reference for fall
is “the student fells in the past”; the reference for move is “the student did move between
2004 and 2006”; and the reference for sex is “woman”.
As we mentionned above, the covariate avmat04 is a relevant control variable for the
unobserved selectivity of schools. By “unobserved” selectivity, we refer to a selectivity bias
that is not self reported by the parents through the covariate select. We now give empirical
arguments supporting that choice.
First, we show the existence of a selectivity bias in the sample. For this, we can compare
the value-added obtained from HLM models that do not contain select with the value-
added that is obtained when we add this covariate. In Table 6, we therefore compare
HLM0 with HLM0b, HLM1 with HLM1b and so on. The five pictures of Figure 2 show
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the comparison of the value-added for the five HLM models. In the plot, value-added in
black color correspond to schools that are such that select > 50%, that is, they have
a high reported selectivity. Red value-added are the other schools, having a low reported
selectivity. In general, these figures show that highly selective schools (in black) have higher
value-added if select is not included in the HLM model. Conversely, the value-added of
less selective schools (in red) have lower value-added if select is not included in the model.
Consequently, the exclusion of select as a covariate benefits the schools which select at
least 50% of the students; and the inclusion of select benefits the schools which select at
most 50% of the students.
To see now how avmat04 helps in controlling the selectivity bias, compare pictures (b)
to (e) in Figure Figure 2. We see that the inclusion of avmat04 as a covariate decreases
the distance between these two types of schools and, therefore, the inclusion/exclusion of
select as a covariate is successfully controlled. The same conclusions can be drawn if the
comparisons are done between schools of the same type (namely, public schools type I; type
II; subsidized; and private).
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Table 5: Results from classical Value-Added analysis
HLM0 HLM0b HLM1 HLM1b HLM2 HLM2b HLM3 HLM3b HLM4 HLM4b HLM5
Intercept
247.5∗ 227.7∗ 218.8∗ 215∗ 93.2∗ 102.1∗ 213.9∗ 210.2∗ 90.0∗ 98.6∗ 100.8∗
(0.9) (0.8) (0.8) (0.9) (4.6)) (4.8) (0.9) (0.9) (4.8) (4.8) (3.1)
mat04
0.83∗ 0.83∗ 0.81∗ 0.8∗ 0.8∗ 0.8∗ 0.81∗ 0.8∗ 0.8∗ 0.8∗ 0.8∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ses B
6.1∗ 3.8∗ 5.7∗ 3.5∗ -0.46 -0.81 4.3∗ 2.1 -1.7 -2.1
(1.2) (1.1) (1.2) (1.1) (0.9) (1.0) (1.1) (1.2) (1.0) (1.0)
ses C
21.6∗ 16.4∗ 20.1∗ 15.1∗ 1.2 0.87 17.2∗ 12.4∗ -1.3 -1.7
(1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2)
ses D
36.3∗ 28.9∗ 34.5∗ 27.4∗ 4.0∗ 3.7∗ 30.4∗ 23.4∗ 0.3 0.1
(1.2) (1.3) (1.2) (1.3) (1.6) (1.5) (1.2) (1.3) (1.5) (1.5)
ses E
46.4∗ 37.2∗ 44.2∗ 35.3∗ 0.94 1.1 39.0∗ 30.3∗ -3.5 -3.4
(1.1) (1.3) (1.2) (1.3) (1.9) (1.9) (1.2) (1.3) (1.9) (1.9)
fall
12.41∗ 12.4∗ 12.4∗ 12.4∗ 12.1∗ 12.0∗ 12.0∗ 12.0∗ 12.0∗
(0.32) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
move
2.68∗ 2.7∗ 2.5∗ 2.6∗ 2.4∗ 2.4∗ 2.2∗ 2.3∗ 2.2∗
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
sex
4.1∗ 4.1∗ 4.0∗ 4.0∗ 4.0∗ 4.0∗ 4.0∗ 4.0∗ 4.0∗
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
fathed
0.32∗ 0.32∗ 0.32∗ 0.32∗ 0.31∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
mothed
0.37∗ 0.37∗ 0.37∗ 0.37∗ 0.36∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
avmat04
0.54∗ 0.49∗ 0.53∗ 0.49∗ 0.47∗
(0.019) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
select
18.0∗ 17.5∗ 6.7∗ 17.2∗ 6.5∗ 6.5∗
(1.3) (1.3) (1.3) (1.3) (1.2) (1.2)
AIC 1,639,134 1,638,954 1,637,231 1,637,056 1,636,625 1,636,593 1,636,892 1,636,722 1,636,298 1,636,268 1,636,289
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Table 6: Results from classical Value-Added analysis (Continued)
HLM0 HLM0b HLM1 HLM1b HLM2 HLM2b HLM3 HLM3b HLM4 HLM4b HLM5
τ̂2A 202.4 189.6 197.8 184.1 153.7 149.0 195.9 183.5 153.6 149.2 149.9
τ̂2B 363.9 318.2 348.1 307.0 207.4 205.0 343.3 302.9 206.7 204.2 206.1
τ̂2C 342.0 300.2 335.5 295.0 199.8 196.4 330.9 292.0 198.7 195.5 195.8
τ̂2D 207.0 186.5 201.3 182.4 151.6 151.5 202.1 183.5 152.3 152.2 153.9
τ̂2E 117.5 117.4 117.0 117.0 142.1 136.4 117.3 117.5 142.4 136.9 136.8
σ̂2A 1372.3 1372.2 1347.9 1347.8 1347.6 1347.5 1345.6 1345.5 1345.2 1345.2 1345.2
σ̂2B 1391.0 1391.0 1373.1 1373.1 1373.1 1373.1 1368.5 1368.5 1368.5 1368.5 1368.5
σ̂2C 1289.4 1289.5 1278.5 1278.5 1278.8 1278.8 1277.3 1277.3 1277.6 1277.6 1277.6
σ̂2D 1192.3 1192.3 1184.2 1184.2 1184.0 1184.0 1183.2 1183.3 1183.0 1183.1 1183.1
σ̂2E 934.3 934.2 928.5 928.4 927.7 927.8 926.3 926.2 925.6 925.6 925.6
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The fixed effects corresponding to the covariates at the individual level are stable across
the different models (when the covariate is included): around 0.8 for mat04; around 12.0
for fall (the coefficient is positive for students who did not fall in the past); around 2.2
for move (the coefficient is positive for students who did not move between 2004 and 2006);
around 4.0 for sex (the coefficient is positive for men); around 0.32 for fathed and 0.37 for
mothed.
With respect to the fixed effects at the school level, the coefficient of select is around
17.0 when avmat04 is not included in the model; when it is included, the coefficient of select
is around 6.5, whereas the coefficient of avmat04 is around 0.50. This also quantifies how
avmat04 controls the selectivity of the school. With respect to the socio-economic level of
the school, the type III test (computed by PROC MIXED of SAS) is significative in all
models. Furthermore, when the t-test corresponding to each category of ses is significant,
the fixed effect for level B is between 3.5 and 6.1; for level C between 12.4 and 21.6; for
level D, between 23.4 and 36.3; and for level E, between 30.3 and 46.4. However, when
avmat04 is included in the model (in HLM2, HLM2b, HLM4 and HLM4b models), some (if
not all) of the categories of ses are non significant. Taking into account the AIC-criterion,
the model HLM4b is the best model although the four categories of ses are non significant.
From the above analysis, we keep model HLM5 as the baseline for the following steps
of our analysis below.
4.3 The endogeneity of some covariables
Although the previous analysis follows a classical approach to compute the value-added, our
description above emphasizes that it relates to structural assumptions, among which the
most critical is certainly the independence between the random effect θj and all covariates.
Recall that mat04ij represents the lagged version of the score and avmat04j denotes
its average over schools. It is likely that these two covariates already contain the effect of
the school, particularly if student i already belongs to school j at that time. Independence
between the school effect θj and variables mat04ij or avmat04j is therefore questionable, and
it raises the important statistical question of what corrections on the value-added calculation
should we apply if this assumption is not fulfilled.
It is possible to support this observation from the SIMCE data. Over all students kept
in the database, 70% have moved between 2004 and 2006. The reason of moving may be
due to the choice of the parents, or may be unavoidable due to the school system itself.
Let us consider the HLM model and the value-added of schools that are calculated from
the subsample of moving students only. In Figure 3 we compare this value-added with the
value-added that is calculated from the whole sample. Both calculations are based on the
HLM5 specification. A high variation is observed between the two calculations, leading to
important differences in the school ranking. To quantify that last point, we notice that the
Spearman correlation between the two value-added predictions is 0.873.
To have a better picture of what happened, it is useful to compare this difference ac-
cording to the school type. As we can observe from the above Table 4, the moving rate
is variable according to the type of school considered: it is 16% for Private Schools, 61%
for Subsidized Schools, 87% for Public Schools Type II and 89% for Public Schools Type
14
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(e)
Figure 2: Impact of avmat04 on selectivity. (a) VA obtained with HLM0 and
HLM0b. (b) VA obtained with HLM1 and HLM1b. (c) VA obtained with HLM3
and HLM3b. (d) VA obtained with HLM2 and HLM2b. (c) VA obtained with
HLM4 and HLM4b.
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Figure 3: Value-added indicators for all the SIMCE data and for the subsample
of moving students
I. From Figure 4 we see that the highest variability are observed for subsidized and private
schools. Although that change is not apparent on average for public schools, noticeable
differences are observed for some of them. Again the Spearman correlation provides an
indication of the concordance in ranking. For private schools, this correlation is 0.689 only,
and it is 0.88 for subsidized schools. It raises to 0.928 and 0.919 for public schools of type I
and II respectively. To summarize, the lowest the moving rate, the lowest the concordance
of school ranks.
It is possible to formally understand the impact of the endogeneity of covariates on school
ranking. For the ease of explanation, consider a simplified HLM model for the SIMCE score
mat06ij = β1 + β2avmat04j + θj + ǫij
with V ar(θj) = V ar(ǫij) = 1. It is realistic to assume that the school effect θj has already
influenced their global score in Mathematics in 2004, avmat04j . Note that θj may contain
a variety of school specific characteristics that may be related to the intrinsic performance
of the school (e.g. effectiveness) or not (e.g. selectivity). To fix the ideas, consider a
school j such that cov(avmat04j, θj) > 0, that is, the influence can be positive or negative
in accordance to the high or low quality of that school. If the endogeneity is ignored
and Maximum Likelihood (or Ordinary Least Square) estimators of the parameters are
computed, then the marginal effect of the variable avmat04j will be overestimated, i.e.
E(βˆ2 | avmat04j) > β2. In this simple model, the predicted random effect of school j is
θ̂j =
1
nj
nj∑
i=1
(mat06ij − βˆ1 − βˆ2 avmat04j)
and is therefore biased downwards. As a consequence, schools j such that cov(avmat04j, θj) >
0 are incorrectly ranked downwards. Equivalently, the schools that are such that cov(avmat04j, θj) <
16
−80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40
−
80
−
60
−
40
−
20
0
20
40
VA computed with the sample
VA
 c
om
pu
te
d 
wi
th
 th
e 
co
m
pl
et
e 
da
ta
 s
et
(a)
−80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40
−
80
−
60
−
40
−
20
0
20
40
VA computed with the sample
VA
 c
om
pu
te
d 
wi
th
 th
e 
co
m
pl
et
e 
da
ta
 s
et
(b)
−80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40
−
80
−
60
−
40
−
20
0
20
40
VA computed with the sample
VA
 c
om
pu
te
d 
wi
th
 th
e 
co
m
pl
et
e 
da
ta
 s
et
(c)
−80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40
−
80
−
60
−
40
−
20
0
20
40
VA computed with the sample
VA
 c
om
pu
te
d 
wi
th
 th
e 
co
m
pl
et
e 
da
ta
 s
et
(d)
Figure 4: Value-added indicators for all the SIMCE data and for the subsample
of moving students. (a) Public schools I; (b) Public schools II; (c) Subsidized
schools; (d) Private schools
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0 are ranked upwards. In other words, lower the covariance between the school performance
and the average score in 2004 is, higher is the over-ranking of the school.
In the last part of this paper, we consider a new estimation of the value-added that is
robust to the endogeneity of mat04ij or avmat04j.
4.4 Value-added under endogeneity
The principal consequence of the endogeneity of the lagged score is that the prediction of
the random effect in HLM models does no longer represent the value-added. Recall the
definition (3) of the value-added in the context of the HLM model (2). If we consider
this model without assuming the exogeneity of the covariates, then the value-added under
endogeneity is given by
VAj = θj − E(θj | mat04ij, avmat04j,X ij) (4)
for all i. This formula shows that the value-added is given by the prediction of the random
effect θj corrected by a term that is vanishing when all covariates are exogenous.
In the following we examine the impact of this correction on SIMCE data. First of all, we
need to construct a prediction of the random effect and, to this end, to consistently estimate
the parameters of the endogenous HLM model. This step uses an instrumental variable ap-
proach that enables to separate the variation of θj from the variation of mat04ij . In our
context, a variable is called instrumental if it is independent from the school-specific effect
but is correlated to the endogenous variables mat04ij and avmat04j . Among the vast liter-
ature on estimation by instrumental variables, we cite the survey by Angrist and Krueger
(2001). In Ebbes et al. (2004), instrumental variable techniques are more specifically ap-
plied on multilevel models. Estimation by instrumental variables is nowadays included in
a lot of softwares, such as Stata (Baum, 2006). In Appendix A below, we fully describe
this statistical model, and also give the complete algorithm for computing the value-added
under endogeneity.
A delicate question in empirical analysis is of course the choice of instrumental variables.
In the SIMCE study, we considered the level of education of the father and the level of
education of the mother as instruments. The fact that these two variables are correlated
with the score of a student is a confirmed fact that is supported by many statistical studies;
for the Chilean case, see, e.g., Sapelli and Vial (2002); R. D. Paredes and Paredes (2009);
for the american test “TIMMS”, see, e.g., Kyriakides (2006); Thomson (2008); for a general
discussion, see Hanushek (2006). Moreover, in the SIMCE data set, the correlation between
fathed and mat04 is 0.38, and between fathed and avmat04 is 0.55, whereas the correlation
between mothed and mat04 is 0.39, and between mothed and avmat04 is 0.55. It is also
plausible to assume that they are independent from the school-specific effect, mainly because
the parents were not educated in the school of their children. At this stage, it is also
important to note that we have controlled for other covariates in the HLM model such as
the variable select. This point is important because the selection might be a common
factor between parents education and the score of their student. Conditionally on this
variables (and on all other covariates), our assumption is thus that parents education is
independent from the school-specific random effect.
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Figure 5: Comparison of the standard value-added versus the value-added cor-
rected for endogeneity for (a) Public schools of type I; (b) Public schools of type
II; (c) Subsidized schools; (d) Private schools.
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We present results of estimation under HLM5 specification, in which mat04ij and avmat04j
are considered as endogenous, and fathed and mothed are instrumental variables. Having
predicted the random effect from this estimation, which we denote by θˆivj , we then compute
a regression on θˆivj to estimate the correction term of the value-added in (4). At this stage,
we note that several options are possible to compute the correction term. In this paper we
specify a linear model for the correction term E(θj | mat04ij, avmat04j,X ij). Because X ij
contains exogenous variables, we do not include those variables in the linear specification.
We thefore estimate the conditional expectation by a linear regression of avmat04j on θˆ
iv
j
with school type fixed effects. The estimated coefficients of the regression is
θˆivj = 46.63 + 5.9δPP − 3.9δII − 4.2δI − 0.17avmat04j + ηj
where δPP , δII , δI are dummy variables for private, type II and type I schools respectively.
All estimated coefficients have p-value less that 0.01.
Figure 5 shows the value-added obtained from (4) versus the value-added obtained from
a standard, exogeneous HLM analysis. The Spearman’s rank correlation between the two
calculations of the value-added over the whole sample is 0.9. This quantifies the impact of
the correction on the ranking of schools. This correlation is similar for each schooltype: it
is 0.9 (Public type I schools), 0.86 (Public type II schools), 0.91 (Subsidized schools) and
0.93 (Private schools).
To interpret the change in the calculated value-added it is useful to look at the density
of the value-added by type of school. Figure 6(a) superimposes the density of the standard
value-added for public schools (type I, dashed line) and subsidized schools (solid line). The
same picture after the correction for endogeneity is displayed in Figure 6(b). The gap that
appeared in Figure (a) between the mode of the two types of schools is clearly reduced after
the correction. The same conclusion is made when comparing the value-added of public
schools and private schools (Figures (c) and (d)). It is also worth mentionning that two
modes appear in the value-added of public schools after correction for endogeneity. The
emergence of differentiated public schools according to their effectiveness is an interesting
substantive question for further research.
5 Conclusion
The main message of the paper is the following. In models of value-added, the lagged test
score that is included as an explanatory variable is very often endogenous. It is in particular
the case when there is little mobility of students between the test occasions. We have shown
the impact of this endogeneity on the calculation of the value-added from a linear multilevel
model, and we have developed a value-added calculation that is robust to this endogeneity.
The paper also raised several questions for further research. We would like to conclude
by summarizing three such questions.
1. The value-added under endogeneity is the prediction of the school random effect plus
a correction term that we have found to be a conditional expectation, see the above
equation (4). In this paper, the correction term is considered as linear but of course
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Figure 6: Density of the standard value-added (a and c) and density of the
value-added corrected for endogeneity (b and d). The dashed, red line is the
density for public type I schools. The solid, black line is the density for subsidized
schools (a and b) and private schools (c and d).
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other choices might be possible here. A study of the specification of this correction
term would be valuable for the generic calculation of the value added under endogene-
ity.
2. The paper provides a structural definition of the value-added as a difference between
two conditional expetations, see equation (3). When the multilevel regression is used
to model the score evolution, it implies that those two conditional expectations are
linear. However non linearities of some explanatory variables (including the lagged
score) is questionable and might be supported by a nonparametric analysis of the
variables in presence. The definition of the value-added given by equation (3) opens
the door for a nonlinear analysis of score evolution.
3. A substantive question appeared in our analysis of the value-added under endogeneity
for public schools in Chile. As we have shown in Figure 6, the value-added of those
schools is bimodal, suggesting the existence of two distinct groups of public schools
according to their effectiveness. One mode is even larger than the mode we have
found for private or subsidized schools. This result calls for further investigation and
characterization of public schools that belong to one or the other mode.
A Instrumental HLM modelling
For the sake of generality, we denote by Yij the contemporaneous score of student i belonging
to school j and by Zij the endogenous variables. In our application, Zij contains covariates
depending on the lagged score. We also recall the notation X ij for the vector of exogeneous
explanatory covariates and θj for the school-specific latent effect. By endogeneity, we mean
that the covariance between θj and Zij is not vanishing. To solve the endogeneity issue,
we suppose to have a vector of instrumental variables, denoted by W ij . The intuition
behind instruments is that they are correlated to the endogenous variables, but they are
not correlated with θj .
We can specify the normal instrumental HLM model as follows:
(i) (Yij | Zij ,X ij,W ij , θj) ∼ N
(
X ijβ + γZij + θj, σ
2
)
(ii) (Zij |X ij ,W ij, θj) ∼ N
(
X ijα +W ijζ + δθj , τ
2
)
(iii) (θj |X ij,W ij) ∼ N
(
0, µ2
)
.
Condition (iii) implies that E(θj | X ij ,W ij) = 0 and, therefore, (X ij,W ij) and θj are
uncorrelated. In other words, bothX ij andW ij are exogenous variables with respect to θj.
Condition (i) implies that, conditionally on (Zij ,X ij , θj), the contemporaneous score Yij is
mutually independent of W ij . Thus, if (i) is rewritten as
Yij =X ijβ + γZij + θj + ǫij, ǫij ∼ N(0, σ
2),
then E(ǫij | W ij) = 0. This condition, along with cor(W ij, θj) = 0, define W ij as an
instrument. It can be shown that the parameters of the instrumental HLM model are
identified provided the dimension of the vector W ij is at least equal to the number of
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endogenous variables. Finally, the distribution of (X ij,W ij) is left unspecified as it is
typically done for exogenous variables; see Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983), Florens,
Mouchart and Rolin (1990, Chapter 3) and Hendry (1995).
It should be remarked that a classical HLM assumes that (θj | Zij ,X ij ,W ij) ∼ N(0, µ
2),
instead of conditions (ii) and (iii) as the instrumental HLM. In particular, E(θj | Zij,X ij ,W ij) =
0 and, therefore, Zij,X ij and W ij are uncorrelated with θj. This condition implies that
X ij and W ij are uncorrelated with θj, but the converse is far from being true.
The value-added indicator is calculated using the following steps:
1. Estimate consistently parameters β and γ by instrumental variable estimation.
2. Predict the random effect and get θˆj.
3. Regress θ̂j on the average of all covariates Z·j and W ·j , and store the predictions
̂̂
θj
from this regression.
4. Compute the value-added as θˆj −
̂̂
θj.
References
Angrist, J. D. and Krueger, A. B. (2001). Instrumental variables and the search for
identification: From supply and demand to natural experiments. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 15, 69–85.
Baum, C. F. (2006). An introduction to modern econometrics using Stata. College Station:
Stata press.
Bellei, C. (2005). ¿Ha tenido tenido impacto la reforma educativa chilena? In C. Cox
(Ed.), Pol´ıticas Educacionales en el cambio de siglo. La reforma del sistema escolar
de Chile. Editorial Universitaria, Santiago de Chile.
Bellei, C., Raczynski, D., Mun˜oz, G. and Perez, L. (2004). ¿Quien dijo que no se puede?:
Escuelas Efectivas en Contextos de Pobreza. Santiago, Chile: UNICEF.
Ebbes, P., Bo¨ckenholt, U. andWedel, M. (2004). Regressor and random-effects dependencies
in multilevel models. Statistica Neerlandica, 58, 161–178.
Embretson, S. E. and Reise, S. P. (2000). Item Response Theory for Psychologists. New
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Engle, R. E., Hendry, D. F. and Richard, J. F. (1983). Exogeneity. Econometrica, 51,
277-304.
Eyzaguirre, B. (2004). Claves para la educacio´n en pobreza. Estudios Pu´blicos, 93, 249–277.
Florens, J.-P., Mouchart, M. and Rolin, J.-M. (1990). Elements of Bayesian Statistics. New
York: Marcel Dekker.
Goldstein, H. and Spiegelhalter, D. (1996). League Tables and Their Limitations: Statistical
Issues in Comparison of Institutional Performance. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society, Series A, 159, 385-443.
Goldstein, H. and Thomas, S. (1996). Using examination results as indicators of school and
college performance. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 159, 407-442.
23
Grilli, L. and Rampichini, C. (2009). Measurement error in multilevel models with sample
cluster means (Working Paper No. 2009/06). Universita` degli Studi di Firenze.
Halaby, C. (2004). Panel models in sociological research: Theory into practice. Annual
Review of Sociology, 30, 507–544.
Hanushek, E. A. (2006). School resources. In E. A. Hanushek and F. Welch (Eds.), Handbook
of the economics of education (pp. 865–908). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Hendry, D. F. (1995). Dynamics Econometrics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hutchison, D., Mifsud, C., Morrison, J., Grech, R., Rudd, P. and Hanson, J. (2005). The
Malta primary literacy value-added project: a template for value-added in small island
states? Research Papers in Education, 20, 303-345.
Kim, J.-S. and Frees, E. W. (2006). Omitted variables in multilevel models. Psychometrika,
71 (4), 659–690.
Kim, J.-S. and Frees, E. W. (2007). Multilevel modelling with correlated effects. Psychome-
trika, 72 (4), 505–533.
Kyriakides, L. (2006). Using international comparative studies to develop the theoretical
framework of educational effectiveness research: A secondary analysis of TIMSS 1999
data. Educational Research and Evaluation, 12, 513–534.
Lockwood, J. R. and McCaffrey, D. F. (2007). Controlling for individual heterogeneity in
longitudinal models, with applications to student achievement. Electronic Journal of
Statistics, 1, 223–252.
Marshall, G., Huerta, I., Alvarado, A. M. and Ponce, J. (2008). Clasificacio´n de Escuelas.
Subvencio´n Escolar Preferencial 2008-2009. Santiago, Chile: Report for the Ministry
of Education of the Chilean Government.
OECD. (2007). Science Competencies for Tomorrow’s World. Volumen 1: Analysis.
Programme for International Student Assessment, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development OECD.
OECD. (2008). Measuring Improvements in Learning Outcomes. Best Practices to Assess
the Value-Added of Schools. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment OECD.
Paredes, R., Dagnino, C., Del Canto, C., Espinosa, G., Lagos, F., Ramı´rez, V. et al. (2010).
Determinacio´n de Esta´ndares e Indicadores de Condiciones para el Aprendizaje en
Establecimientos Educacionales. Santiago, Chile: Report for the Ministry of Education
of the Chilean Government.
Paredes, R. D. and Paredes, V. (2009). Chile: academic performance and educational
management under a rigid employment regime. CEPAL Review, 99, 117-129.
Pino, G. del, Gonzlez, J., Manzi, J. and San Mart´ın, E. (2009). Estudio Piloto de Valor
Agregado 3o Ba´sico 2006 - 4o Medio 2007. Santiago, Chile: Report for the Ministry
of Education of the Chilean Government.
Pino, G. del, San Mart´ın, E., Manzi, J. and Taut, S. (2008). Estudio Piloto de Valor
Agregado 8o Ba´sico 2004 - 2o Medio 2006. Santiago, Chile: Report for the Ministry
of Education of the Chilean Government.
Pino, G. del, San Mart´ın, E., Manzi, J., Taut, S. and Gonza´lez, J. (2008). Estudio Piloto
de Valor Agregado 4o Ba´sico 2005 - 5o Ba´sico 2006. Santiago, Chile: Report for the
24
Ministry of Education of the Chilean Government.
Raudenbush, S. W. (2004). What are value-added models estimating and what does this
imply for statistical practice? Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 29,
121–129.
Raudenbush, S. W. and Willms, J. D. (1995). The estimation of school effects. Journal of
Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 20, 307–335.
Sapelli, C. and Vial, B. (2002). The Performance of Private and Public Schools in the
Chilean Voucher System. Cuadernos de Economı´a, 39, 423-454.
Silverman, B. W. (1986). Density Estimation. London: Chapman and Hall.
SIMCE. (2008). Niveles de Logro 4o Bsico para Educacio´n Matema´tica. Unidad de
Curr´ıculum y Evaluacin (UCE), Ministerio de Educacio´n, Gobierno de Chile. Avail-
able at http://www.simce.cl/index.php?id=419.
SIMCE. (2009). Resultados Nacionales SIMCE 2008. Unidad de Curr´ıculum
y Evaluacin (UCE), Ministerio de Educacio´n, Gobierno de Chile. Available at
http://www.simce.cl/index.php?id=430.
Steele, F., Vignoles, A. and Jenkins, A. (2007). The effect of school resources on pupil
attainment: a multilevel simultaneous equation modelling approach. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society: Series A, 170, 801–824.
Tekwe, C. D., Carter, R. L., Ma, C. X., Algina, J., Lucas, M. E., Roth, J. et al. (2004). An
Empirical Comparison of Statistical Models for Value-Added Assessment of School
Performance. Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 29, 11–36.
Thomson, S. (2008). Examining the Evidence from TIMSS: Gender Differences in Year 8
Science Achievement in Australia. Studies in Educational Evaluation, 34, 73–81.
25
